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This article seeks to explore two questions.  First, given that the legal effects of an 
adoption order and a parental order made under s. 54 of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 are virtually identical while the statutory conditions for each are 
different, would the granting of one in circumstances designed for the other create 
any genuine problem and do the differences in aims justify the different conditions for 
each order?  Secondly, when is it right for the court to override statutory conditions 
on the ground that the welfare of the child requires the order to be made?  Does 
ZHOIDUH³WUXPS´DOORURQO\VRPHFRQGLWLRQVDQGLIRQO\VRPHthen how do we 
distinguish between competency determining conditions and those subject to welfare 
considerations?  Both questions arise from a decision of the President of the Family 
Division, in which the judge held (i) WKDWWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHRYHUURGHDVWDWXWRU\
requirement, and (ii) that the use of the adoption legislation, which contained no such 
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requirement, would be entirely unsuitable for the circumstances in which a parental 
order was sought.  It will be suggested that this approach is an unnecessary 
subversion of the expressed will of Parliament; it will be concluded that parental 
orders, by avoiding the policy balances of adoption, are themselves dangerous and 
ought to be abolished.  These issues will be explored in the context of both Scots 
and English law because parental orders, though designed to reflect the different 
adoption rules in each of these jurisdictions, contain elements traced to English law 
that fit imperfectly into the Scottish system. 
 
Introduction 
Most legal systems allocate parenthood of children according to rules designed to 
reflect the natural connection between progenitor and child while at the same time 
taking account of the messy realities of life; many legal systems also have a process 
to transfer parenthood from those identified as parents by the normal rules to those 
who seek to EHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHFKLOG¶VXSEULQJLQJ,QWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPOHJDO
systems, there are two such processes.  First, there is adoption, wholly a creature of 
statute, and governed in Great Britain separately by the Adoption and Children Act 
2002 (for England and Wales) and the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007.1  
Secondly, there are parental orders after surrogacy, likewise creatures of statute, 
and governed throughout the United Kingdom2 by s.54 of the unitary Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 20083 and its associated regulations.4 
Both orders place thHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHat the heart of the FRXUW¶Vconsideration,5 but 
with each it is important to remember that welfare is not relevant to every question 
before the court.  Welfare has no role to play in resolving disputes of either fact or 
law: TXHVWLRQVRIZKRWKHFKLOG¶VSDUHQWVDUH and whose consent, therefore, is 
                                               
1 +HUHLQDIWHUUHVSHFWLYHO\³WKH$FW´DQG³WKH$FW´6LPSO\IRUHDVHWKLVDUWLFOHZLOO
not be examining the separate adoption regime in Northern Ireland. 
2 The legislation is a matter reserved to Westminster and so the Scottish Parliament 
currently has no power to amend it: Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5, part 2, para J3. 
3 +HUHLQDIWHU³WKH$FW´ 
4 Primarily the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Orders) Regulations 2010 (SI 
KHUHLQDIWHU³WKH5HJXODWLRQV´ 
5 2002 Act, s.1(2); 2007 Act, s.14(3), and applied to parental orders by the 2010 
Regulations, Schs 1 and 3. 
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required to the making of either order, and whether that consent has been given, or 
is unconditional, cannot be resolved by application of the welfare test.  Nor can the 
FKLOG¶VZHOIDUHGHWHUPLQHWKHYHU\FRPSHWHQF\RIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQ: issues such as title 
to seek the order, or the jurisdiction of the court, are determined on their own terms, 
LUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHHIIHFWRIWKHLUUHVROXWLRQRQWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH6  The so-called 
³WKUHVKROGWHVW´VHUYHV, in public law cases, to emphasise the crucial difference 
EHWZHHQWKHTXHVWLRQV³&Dn the RUGHUEHPDGH"´(in answering ZKLFKWKHFKLOG¶V
welfare is irrelevant) DQG³6KRXOGWKHRUGHUEHPDGH"´ (in answering which welfare is 
central).7  That distinction is equally crucial in private law actions such as parental 
order applications, and the failure to keep it in mind lies behind the difficult decision 
of Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, in Re X (A Child)(Surrogacy: 
Time Limit).8 
Here, a parental order was made over of a child who was almost 3 years old, 
notwithstanding WKHH[SOLFLWDQGXQDPELJXRXVUXOHLQVRIWKH$FWWKDW³WKH
applicant must apply for the order during the period of 6 months beginning with the 
GD\RQZKLFKWKHFKLOGLVERUQ´.  Munby P held that Parliament could not have 
intended to create an absolute bar on parental orders after the child reached the age 
of 6 months, even in circumstances in which making the order was clearly in the 
FKLOG¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWV.  It followed, he held, that the word ³PXVW´ required to be 
LQWHUSUHWHGSXUSRVLYHO\LQVXFKDZD\DVIXUWKHUVWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH9  This 
conclusion, though not without precedent,10 was in the circumstances unnecessary 
                                               
6 7UXHLWLVWKDW%UXVVHOV,,5HYLVHGDUWDOORZVWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHWREHDIDFWRULQ
GHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUWRWUDQVIHUMXULVGLFWLRQRQFHHVWDEOLVKHGEXWWKHUH³WKHTXHVWLRQLVQRW
what eventual outcome to the case will be in the best interests of the child but whether the 
WUDQVIHUZLOOEHLQKHUEHVWLQWHUHVWV´SHU/DG\+DOHLQRe N (Children) [2016] UKSC 15 at 
>@,QDQ\FDVH%UXVVHOV,,5HYLVHGGRHVQRWDSSO\WRDGRSWLRQRU³WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI
a parent-FKLOGUHODWLRQVKLS´DUWDDQGE)), which surely includes parental orders. 
7 That welfare only comes into play once the statutory threshold has been crossed was 
emphasised by Munby P in Re N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) [2016] 2 WLR 713 at 
[30]-[31] and by the Court of Session in R v Stirling Council [2016] CSIH 36 at [13].  This is 
also true of the question of proportionality: Re B (Care Proceedings; Appeal) [2013] UKSC 
33 [2013] 2 FLR 1075 and Re W [2016] EWCA Civ 793, esp. at [68] ± [69]. 
8 [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam) [2015] 1 FLR 349. 
9 See especially Munby P at [31]-[33]. 
10 Munby P cites various cases in which statutory time limits have been extended by English 
judges.  Without an in-depth analysis of wide-ranging case law it is not possible to say 
definitively whether the Scottish judges are less inclined than their English counterparts to 
depart from statutory time limits, but it is relevant to note that the Inner House of the Court of 
Session in Simpson v Downie 2012 CSIH 74 at [13] described the statutory time limit in that 
case ZKLFKWKH\UHIXVHGWRH[WHQGDVRQHRI³MXULVGLFWLRQDOFRPSHWHQF\´ 
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given that if the surrogacy legislation were not able to achieve the transference of 
parentKRRGUHTXLUHGE\WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHexactly that transference could 
nevertheless be achieved through the adoption legislation, as happened for example 
in C v S,11 the only surrogacy case to appear in the Scottish law reports.12  But this 
solution did not commend itself to Munby PZKRGLVPLVVHGDGRSWLRQDV³QRWDQ
DWWUDFWLYHVROXWLRQJLYHQWKHFRPPLVVLRQLQJIDWKHU¶VH[LVWLQJELRORJLFDOUHODWLRQVKLS
ZLWK;´13  He was followed in this by Theis J in AB  (Parental Order: Consent of 
Surrogate Mother) v CT,14 who held, adopting the President¶VODQJXDJH WKDW³the 
DSSOLFDQWVDQGWKHFKLOGUHQ«ZLOOVXIIHU«immense and irremediable prejudice «LI
this appliFDWLRQLVVWRSSHGLQLWVWUDFNV´15 
The decision in Re X (A Child), which has been followed in numerous cases since,16 
raises the two questions which this article seeks to address.  First, if the condition in 
s.54(3) requires to be interpreted LQOLJKWRIWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHGRHVWKLVDOVRIROORZ
for the other conditions in s.54?  Are Mason and McCall Smith right in concluding 
WKDW³WKHWUXPSLQJSULQFLSOHRIWKHZHOIDUHRIWKHFKLOGLVVZHHSLQJDZD\DOOWKH
GHWDLOHGDWWHPSWVLQWKHODZWRUHJXODWH>VXUURJDF\@´"17  Secondly, are the 
circumstances that properly found an adoption application so different from the 
circumstances behind a parental order application that granting one in circumstances 
for which the other was designed GRHVLQGHHGFRQVWLWXWH³LPPHQVHDQGLUUHPHGLDEOH
SUHMXGLFH´IRUWKHFKLOG"Are the legislative differences in the two orders justified by 
their different aims?  This second question is complicated somewhat by the fact that 
the adoption law in England and Wales is different from the adoption law in Scotland, 
                                               
11 1996 SLT 1387. 
12 There have been more cases.  The National Records of Scotland show a handful of 
parental orders being made each year since the first in 2003.  Between 2003 and 2008 there 
were 15 orders in total; between 2009 (when eligibility was extended to same-sex and 
unmarried couples) and 2014 there were 52 in total. 
13 [2014] EWHC 3135 [2015] 1 FLR 349 at [7]. 
14 [2015] EWFC 12  [2015] EWFC 12 [2016] 1 FLR 41.  See also Re A (A Child) [2015] 
EWHC 911 at [56] ± [69] and Re Z (A Child) (Surrogate Father: Parental Order) [2015] 
EWFC 73 [2015] 1 WLR 4993 at [16] and [36]. 
15 [2015] EWFC 12 at [40] (emphasis added to the phrase first used by Munby P in Re X (A 
Child) at [65]). 
16 AB & CD v CT [2015] EWFC 12 [2016] 1 FLR 41 (twins almost 4 years old); A v X [2015] 
EWHC 2080 (twins 3 years old); Re A and B (Children) [2015] EWHC 911 (children 5 and 8 
years old). 
17 J Mason and A McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics (10th edn, 2016), para.8.107. 
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while the rules for parental orders purport to be the same, and so a certain amount of 
comparison between the adoption laws in these two legal systems is unavoidable. 
 
Legislative History of Parental Orders 
Parental orders were created by the UK-wide statute, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990.  Governmental intention in introducing these orders is 
impossible to determine, because the policy objective changed, without explanation.  
The Bill that became the 1990 Act had no provision for parental orders throughout 
most of its Parliamentary passage.  Indeed, at its Third Reading in the Upper House, 
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, reiterated Government policy against 
the development of surrogacy as an acceptable practice and stated that where it did 
RFFXUWKHFRPPLVVLRQLQJFRXSOH³ZLOOKDYHWRDGRSWWKHEDE\LIWKH\ZDQWWREHFRPH
LWVOHJDOSDUHQWV´18  This remained the approach as the Bill made its way through the 
House of Commons until the final stage.  Earlier, at Second Reading in the Lower 
House, an MP had raised the case of two of his constituents whose gametes had 
been used to create an embryo for implantation into a surrogate.  On being told that 
they would need to adopt the child they were affronted³LWLVOLNHEX\LQJRQH¶V own 
possessions back´19  With neither explanation nor debate, but apparently in 
response to this intervention, a Government amendment at Report Stage20  was 
accepted and became s.30 of the Act, which was passed the next day. 
The regulatory sections of the 1990 Act were substantially amended, and the 
parenthood provisions replaced, by the 2008 Act.  Section 30 was re-enacted as 
s.54, and it was only the changes (the expansion of eligibility to seek a parental 
order to same-sex couples and unmarried couples) that were discussed at 
Committee stage.21  An amendment to further extend eligibility to single people was 
resisted by the Government.  The minister distinguished surrogacy from adoption: 
with the former but not the latter the child is brought into existence expressly for the 
purpose sought to be achieved by the court order.  The magnitude of the surrogacy 
arrangement and the responsibilities it generates led the Government to conclude 
                                               
18 HL Deb. 20th March 1990, vol. 517 cols. 206-207. 
19 HC Deb, 2nd April 1990, vol. 170 col. 945. 
20 HC Deb. 20th June 1990, vol. 174 col. 1041. 
21 HC Public Bill Committee, 12 June 2008, cols. 246 ± 252. 
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that these responsibilities are best taken on by a couple.22  The amendment was 
withdrawn and the 2008 Act passed with s.54 as drafted by the Government, 
identical to s.30 of the 1990 Act other than ZLWKDQH[WHQGHGGHILQLWLRQRI³FRXSOH´
eligible to apply for a parental order. 
The policy behind the introduction and re-enactment of parental orders remains, 
therefore, obscure but it would seem that Parliament intended a mechanism to avoid 
the need for adoption when at least one of the commissioning couple is the genetic 
parent.  In addition, a desire to protect the surrogate mother is both inherent in the 
legislation itself, with the 1990 Act amending the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 
to make any such arrangements unenforceable,23 and apparent from what few 
Governmental statements there are.24  Beyond these considerations, the 
speculations of either judges or academic commentators on what might be the 
purpose of any part of the parental order legislation remain merely that.  But it is 
noticeable that the welfare of the child was never once mentioned in any 
Governmental or Parliamentary statement about parental orders.  They were 
designed to address DGXOWV¶ZLVKHVUDWKHUWKDQFKLOGUHQ¶VZHOIDUH 
 
Similarities Between Adoption Orders and Parental Orders 
At first glance, the similarities between the two orders are striking, and were clearly 
designed to be so.  Many of the statutory rules governing adoption are applied with 
no more than terminological modifications to parental orders.  The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Orders) Regulations 2010 apply many of the 
crucial provisions in the adoption legislation to parental orders:25 examples include 
s.46 of the 2002 Act and s.35 of the 2007 Act, which set out the effect of making an 
                                               
22 Ibid., col. 249. 
23 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, s. 1A, inserted by s.36 of the 1990 Act.  Both the 
existence of s.27 of the 1990 Act (now s.33 of the 2008 Act), under which the surrogate 
mother is always recognised as mother, and the absence in s.30 (now s.54) of any power to 
dispense with her consent, were designed to ensure that she retains control and cannot be 
held to any prior agreement to give up her child.  
24 See Lord Mackay at HL Deb. 20th March 1990, vol. 517 cols. 205-206 when he 
emphasised that unenforceabilit\ZDVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHVXUURJDWH¶VVDNH 
25 These provide not only that specified provisions in the 2002 and 2007 Acts apply to 
parental orders (Schs 1 and 3 for England and Wales and for Scotland respectively) but also 
that various references in other legislation to adoption orders are to be read as including 
parental orders (Sch 4). 
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adoption order; and s.67 of the 2002 Act and s.40 of the 2007 Act, which provide that 
an adopted person is to be treated in law as if born as the child of the person(s) who 
obtained the order and no-one else.26  These provisions ensure that the overall effect 
of both orders is virtually identical: a radical transference not only of the responsibility 
and right to bring up the child but also of parenthood itself from one set of parents 
FRPPRQO\FDOOHGWKH³ELUWKSDUHQWV´LQDGRSWLRQDQGWKH³VXUURJDWH mother´and her 
partner27 in surrogacy) to another.  In G v G (Parental Order: Revocation)28 Hedley J 
described the HIIHFWRIDSDUHQWDORUGHUDVHQVXULQJWKDWHDFKDSSOLFDQWLV³LQWKH
position of an adopted or married parent with lifelong status and inalienable parental 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\´ He went on: ³Like an adoption a parental order both confers lifelong 
status on the applicant and deprives those who until then had parental status of that 
status on a lifelong basis.´29  The decision in that case, that neither order, once 
made, is (generally speaking)30 revocable, except by the making of an adoption 
order, or a further adoption order,31 serves to emphasise both the unique nature of 
the two orders and their unity of purpose. 
Not only the effect of the two orders but also the factors to be taken into account by 
the court in considering whether to make the order are deliberately the same, with 
s.1 of the 2002 Act and s.14 of the 2007 Act being applicable to both orders.32  The 
most important element of these sections is that the need to safeguard and promote 
WKHZHOIDUHRIWKHFKLOGWKURXJKRXWWKHFKLOG¶VOLIHLVWKHFRXUW¶Vparamount 
                                               
26 The consequences are life-long and not limited to upbringing: Forman v Advocate General 
for Scotland [2016] CSOH 94. 
27 2FFDVLRQDOO\UHIHUUHGWRDV³WKHVXUURJDWHIDWKHU´see Re X (A Child)(Surrogacy: Time 
Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 [2015] 1 FLR 349 at [6].  Terminological ambiguity as to who is the 
UHDO³VXUURJDWH´PRWKHUKDVORQJEHHQUHFRJQLVHGEXWLVUHSOLFDWHGZLWKPHQWRRRe Z (A 
Child) (Surrogate Father: Parental Order) [2015] EWFC 73 [2015] 1 WLR 4993 has the law 
UHSRUWHUEXWQRWWKHMXGJHXVLQJ³VXUURJDWHIDWKHU´WRGHVFULEHWKHFRPPLVVLRQLQJDQG
genetic) father. 
28 [2012] EWHC 1979 [2013] 1 FLR 286 at [29]. 
29 Ibid at [33]. 
30 Revocability of adoption orders is possible in exceptional cases: as a recent example, see 
PK v K [2015] EWHC 2316. 
31 The Scottish provision allowing an adopted child to be further adopted (2007 Act, s.28(6)) 
is applied in modified form by the 2010 Regulations.  The modification is inept and makes 
sense only by reading it to allow an adoption order to be made over a child who is subject to 
a parental order.  The equivalent English provision (2002 Act, s.46(5)) is not applied to 
parental orders.  The application in Scots law may simply be for the avoidance of doubt, for 
there seems no basis upon which an English court could reject an adoption application on 
the ground that the child is already subject to a parental order. 
32 2010 Regulations, Schs 1 and 3. 
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consideration.  To which issues that principle applies will be the subject of much of 
the discussion below. 
Likewise the court rules governing the application processes show close similarities.  
In Scotland the court, for both types of application, must appoint a curator ad litem 
and a reporting officer,33 who must investigate and report on similar facts, except that 
in applications for parental orders there is no requirement for the curator to obtain 
particulars on the home circumstances oIWKHSHWLWLRQHUVRURIWKHFKLOG¶VDQG
SHWLWLRQHUV¶UDFLDORULJLQFXOWXUDODQGOLQJXLVWLFEDFNJURXQG  The equivalent rules for 
England and Wales are found in the Family Procedure Rules 2010,34 which require 
that either a parental order reporter or an adoption reporting officer be appointed.35  
And the 2010 Regulations provide for the establishment and maintenance of parental 
order registers on the same terms as for adoption registers.36 
 
Dissimilarities Between the Two Orders 
In terms of process, the major difference between adoption orders and parental 
orders is that local authorities have a central role in adoption that is entirely missing 
with parental orders.  All local authorities are obliged to maintain adoption services,37 
while there is no such ³VHUYLFH´LQUHODWLRQWRVXUURJDF\DQGDJHQFLHVWRDVVLVWSDUWLHV
seeking to utilise surrogacy, such as they exist, are entirely private and charitable.  
Local authorities are also involved in the court process in relation to adoption: where 
a child has been placed by an adoption agency (as all local authorities are) a report 
by the agency must be submitted to the court;38 if the child has not been so placed 
(that is to say, typically, in cases of step-parent adoptions) notice of the application 
                                               
33 Act of Sederunt (Child Care and Maintenance Rules) 1997 (SI 1997/291 (S.19)), r.2.50 for 
parental orders and Sheriff Court Adoption Rules 2009 (SSI 2009/284), r.12 for adoption 
orders. 
34 SI 2010/2955.  Part 13 governs applications for parental orders and Part 14 for adoption 
orders. 
35 Family Procedure Rules, r.13.5(1)(a)(iii); r.14(6)(1)(iii) and (iv). 
36 2010 Regulations, Sch 1 adapting ss.77 and 79 and Sch 1 paras 1 and 4 of the 2002 Act; 
Sch 3, adapting ss.53 and 55 and Sch 1 paras 1, 2 and 4 of the 2007 Act.  Revealingly, the 
1DWLRQDO5HFRUGVRI6FRWODQGFODVVLI\SDUHQWDORUGHUVDVDVHSDUDWH³7\SHRI$GRSWLRQ´WKH
RWKHU³W\SHV´EHLQJ³5HJXODU´DQG³)RUHLJQ´VHH156Vital Events Reference Tables. 
37 2002 Act, s.3; 2007 Act, s.1. 
38 2002 Act, s.43; 2007 Act, s.17. 
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must be given to the local authority,39 which must then investigate the matter and 
submit a report of that investigation to the court.40  The transference of parenthood 
through adoption, even in the private setting of family reconstitution, is perceived to 
give the state an interest, manifested in the responsibilities of the local authority.  
The application for a parental order after surrogacy, however, is more purely a 
private law process, and subject therefore to far less state oversight.  This is seen 
once again by comparing the heavily regulated practice of international adoption 
(including an absolute ban on commercial adoption41) with the virtually complete lack 
of regulation of international surrogacy.42 
 
Dissimilarities Between the Two Jurisdictions 
The design of the 2010 Regulations implies that any differences in the approach to 
parental orders between Scotland and England and Wales will be explained by their 
differing adoption rules, but on at least two occasions the equivalent rules are 
included in the 2010 Regulations for Scotland but not for England and Wales.  First, 
in Scotland parental orders may be subject to such terms and conditions (typically in 
relation to post-order contact) as the court thinks fit because the adoption rule to this 
effect is applied.43  In England and Wales on the other hand the equivalent general 
power to impose conditions on adoption orders that previously existed44 was 
replaced in the 2002 Act by a requirement that the adoption court must consider 
whether there should be arrangements for allowing any person contact with the 
                                               
39 2002 Act, s.44, 2007 Act, s.18. 
40 2002 Act, s.44, 2007 Act, s.19.  For the information to be contained in these reports see 
the Sheriff Court Adoption Rules, rule 8(4) (for Scotland) and rule 14.11 of the Family 
Procedure Rules 2010 (for England). 
41 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, art. 4(c)(3). 
42 The nearest English law has come to regulating international surrogacy is Re L (Children) 
[2015] EWFC 90 where Russell J required that applications for parental orders over children 
ERUQDEURDGEHDOORFDWHGWRMXGJHVRIWKH+LJK&RXUW$Q([SHUWV¶*URXSDWWKH+DJXH
Conference on Private International Law on the issue determined to focus its attention on 
recognition rather than international regulation: see para. [16] of the Report of the February 
0HHWLQJRIWKH([SHUWV¶*URXSRQ3DUHQWDJH6XUURJDF\, available from the Hague 
&RQIHUHQFH¶VZHEVLWHXQGHU³7KH3DUHQWDJH6XUURJDF\3URMHFW´ 
43 2007 Act, s.28(3), applied to parental orders by the 2010 Regulations Sch 3. 
44 Adoption Act 1976, s.12(6). 
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child:45 that provision, however, was not applied to parental orders by the 2010 
Regulations.46  It follows that parental orders are always unconditional in England 
and Wales (unlike adoption orders), but in Scotland may (like adoption orders) be 
conditional. 
Secondly, in Scotland the rules permitting adopted persons over the age of 16 to 
obtain information about themselves contained in the register of births are applied to 
parental orders.47  In contrast, the English mechanism to allow the tracing of birth 
families, the Adoption Contact Register whereby persons over the age of 18 may be 
UHJLVWHUHGDV³H[SUHVVLQJWKHLUZLVKHVDVWRPDNLQJFRQWDFWZLWKWKHLUUHODWLYHV´48 
has not been replicated for parental orders.  The subject of a parental order wishing 
to trace their genetic parent in England will have to rely on the rules on disclosure of 
donor information,49 but these rules do not accommodate the identification of the 
(non-genetic) birth mother.  This means that the subject of a parental order can 
always trace their birth mother in Scotland but may do so in England and Wales only 
if the birth mother is also the genetic mother. 
The curious result of these differences between the jurisdictions is that parental 
orders are closer to adoption orders in Scotland than in England.  This may go some 
ZD\WRH[SODLQLQJWKH6FRWVODZ\HU¶VEHPXVHPHQWDWWKH(QJOLVKFRXUWV¶DQWLSDWK\WR
using adoption as a mechanism to achieve the aim of a surrogacy arrangement. 
 
Conditions for Making a Parental Order 
The very structure of s.54 serves to obscure the nature of its terms, and in particular 
whether the conditions it lays down are absolute or are qualified by welfare 
considerations. 
Subsection (1) provides as follows: 
                                               
45 2002 Act, s.46(6). 
46 The 2010 Regulations, Sch 1 para 1 applies only the rules in s.46(1) ± (4) of the 2002 Act 
to parental orders.  Likewise, ss.51A and 51B, which concerns post-adoption contact, do not 
apply to parental orders. 
47 2007 Act, s.55(1)-(4), applied by 2010 Regulations, Sch.3. 
48 2002 Act, s.80. 
49 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) 
Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/1511). 
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³2QDQDSSOLFDWLRQPDGHE\WZRSHRSOH³WKHDSSOLFDQWV´WKHFRXUWPD\PDNH
an order providing for a child to be treated in law as the child of the applicants 
if² 
(a) the child has been carried by a woman who is not one of the applicants, as 
a result of the placing in her of an embryo or sperm and eggs or her artificial 
insemination, 
(b) the gametes of at least one of the applicants were used to bring about the 
creation of the embryo, and 
FWKHFRQGLWLRQVLQVXEVHFWLRQVWRDUHVDWLVILHG´ 
Paragraphs (a) and (b) contain what look like competency determining conditions-
precedent which must be satisfied before the court has jurisdiction to examine the 
merits of the case, but are they of a different nature from the conditions in 
subsections (2) to (8)?  If not, why are they structurally separated?  It is tempting to 
see subsection (1) as simply setting out the factual circumstances in which it is 
envisaged a parental order will be suitable, but the terms contained therein have not 
been treated by the courts any differently from the conditions in subsections (2) to 
(8).  Probably all that can be done is to treat each condition, wherever it appears in 
s.54, as a separate condition which may or may not be as absolute as it sounds. 
 
The Time-limit Condition 
Though not the first mentioned, it is appropriate to start with the condition laid down 
in s.54(3).  The major difference at the heart of Re X (A Child)(Surrogacy: Time 
Limit)50 between adoption and parental orders concerned the time-limit for the 
making of the order.  With adoption the time-limit for the application to be made is 
WKHFKLOG¶VHLJKWHHQWKELUWKGD\51  With parental orders, the 2008 Act requires that the 
application ³PXVW´EHPDGHZLWKLQVL[ PRQWKVRIWKHFKLOG¶VELUWK,52 though this rule 
                                               
50 [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam) [2015] 1 FLR 349. 
51 2002 Act, s.49(4); 2007 Act, ss.28(4).  The English Act (but not the Scottish) additionally 
provides that the subject of the adoption order must not have reached their 19th birthday by 
the time the order is made: 2002 Act, s.47(9). 
52 2008 Act, s.54(3). 
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does not apply when subsection (11) does.53  Now, the normal canons of 
construction provide that where one exception is specified to a statutory rule there 
are likely to be no others,54 but that is not the approach that the English court has 
taken in relation to s.54(3) and, on numerous occasions, starting with Munby P¶V
decision in Re X, applications have been allowed to proceed beyond the specified 
time-limit even although the case is not within the single stated exception, on the 
JURXQGWKDW3DUOLDPHQW¶VSXUSRVHZLWKVZDVWRHQVXUHWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH55 
There are two major flaws LQ0XQE\3¶Vreasoning.  First, it effectively leaves the 
provision meaningless, contrary to another well-established rule of statutory 
interpretation, that statutory language needs to be construed in such a way as gives 
it some substantive effect.56  7RKROGWKDW³PXVW´PHDQV³PD\´PHDQVWKDW³PXVW´
means nothing at all.  Secondly, it asserts without establishing that the furtherance of 
WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHLVWKHSUHGRPLQDQWSXUSRVHRIWKHFRQGLWLRQLQV± if not s.54 
as a whole.  This purpose was not reflected in the minimal parliamentary debates on 
the section, which focused as we have seen more on the emotional needs of the 
commissioning couple and the imperative to protect the surrogate mother from 
exploitation.  It seems more likely that the time limit was included simply to reflect the 
typical fact scenario of surrogacy: a child being handed over to the commissioning 
couple shortly after birth.  In that scenario it is to the benefit of all parties (and not 
just the child) that their status, vis-à-vis each other, be regularised without delay.57 
                                               
53 Section 54(11) is a transitional provision, allowing an application to be made in relation to 
a child of any age, so long as it is made within six months of the provision coming into force 
and is made by a couple who would not have been eligible to make the application before 
then.  The exception is now, of course, spent. 
54 F Bennion Statutory Interpretation (6th HGQSVHWVRXWVRIKLV&RGH³7KH
principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius LVRIWHQDSSOLHGWRZRUGVRIH[FHSWLRQ´WKRXJK
KHGRHVJRRQWRVXJJHVWWKDWZLWKVWDWHGH[FHSWLRQV³SDUWLFXODUFDXWLRQ´LVQHHGHGLQ
applying the expressio unius SULQFLSOHIRUIHDURIDWWULEXWLQJ³WRRPXFKUDWLRQDOLW\WR
3DUOLDPHQW´ 
55 See n.16 above. 
56 %HQQLRQSVHWVRXWVRIKLV&RGH³,WLVDUXOHRIODZWKDWWKHOHJLVODWRULQWHQGVWKH
interpreter of an enactment to observe the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat (it is 
EHWWHUIRUDWKLQJWRKDYHHIIHFWWKDQWREHPDGHYRLG´+HHODERUDWHVLQKLV&RPPHQW³$Q
Act must be construed so that its provisions are given force and effect rather than being 
UHQGHUHGQXJDWRU\´1RWHWKHLPSHUDWLYH 
57 Munby P in Re X (A Child)(Surrogacy: Time Limit) at [50] speculated that Eleanor King -¶V
conclusion to this effect in JP v LP and others (surrogacy arrangement: wardship) [2014] 
(:+&>@$OO(5DW>@ZDV³OLWWOHPRUHWKDQVSHFXODWLRQ´ 
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The time limit in adoption reflects and indeed furthers the very purpose of adoption 
itself ± to ensure an appropriate upbringing for a child.  As such, there is no 
possibility of the court interpreting the rule to allow an adoption order to be made 
over an adult.58 It follows that an adoption order made after the child has become an 
adult suffers from a radical incompetency and cannot stand.59  With an application 
for a parental order, the child older than six months remains a child with many years 
of upbringing still required, though that could equally be assured by adoption, at the 
cost only of the self-defined hurt of those who would be parents. 
 
7KH³&RXSOH´Condition 
It has been a feature of parental orders since their creation that they must be applied 
for by two people,60 acting together.61  Single applications for adoption orders, on the 
other hand, have always been possible.62  While this includes both the single 
stranger and the natural parent of the child (if certain conditions are satisfied),63 the 
most common form of single person adoption is the so-FDOOHG³VWHS-SDUHQWDGRSWLRQ´
Originally, step-parent adoption could be effected only by a joint application with the 
parent, who had to give up their natural parental responsibilities and parental rights 
and reacquire them through the adoption order.64  This clumsiness was removed in 
Scotland by s.97 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, which amended the then 
extant legislation to permit a sole application to be made by a step-parent, with their 
spouse retaining their own natural parenthood.  The 2007 Act completed the process 
by making it incompetent for a joint application to be made when one or both 
                                               
58 In Re B (A Minor) (Adoption Order: Nationality) [1999] 2 AC 136 the House of Lords 
alloZHGDQDGRSWLRQRUGHUWRVWDQGZKLFKKDGEHHQPDGHVKRUWO\EHIRUHWKHFKLOG¶Vth 
birthday (to confer British nationality).  Lord Hoffmann accepted that an adoption order ought 
not to be made in circumstances in which the applicants would not thereafter exercise any 
parental responsibility. 
59 &DPHURQY0DF,QW\UH¶V([HFXWRU 2006 SLT 176. 
60 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s.30(1); 2008 Act, s.54(1). 
61 Since the 2008 Act, s.54(2), the applicants must be married, civilly partnered or two 
persons who are living as partners in an enduring family relationship and are not within the 
prohibited degrees of relationship in relation to each other. 
62 See now s.51 of the 2002 Act and s.30 of the 2007 Act.  The prior legislation in both 
jurisdictions contained restrictions on applications by single men but these were not, in 
principle, incompetent. 
63 2002 Act, s.51(4); 2007 Act, s.30(7). 
64 See A and B, Petitioners (1931) 47 Sh. Ct. Rep. 255. 
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applicants is the natural parent of the child.65  Such joint applications remain 
competent in England and Wales,66 WKRXJKDVLQ6FRWODQGWKHSDUHQW¶VSDUWQHUPD\ 
now also apply singly.67 
Most adoption applications in both jurisdictions are made by couples.  Originally a 
joint adoption application could be made only by a married (necessarily opposite-
sex) couple68 and this was reflected in the original rules relating to parental orders.69  
The current adoption legislation extended this to include cohabiting and same-sex 
couples,70 though the definition of cohabiting couple in the Scottish Act ³persons 
who are living together as if husband and wife [or as civil partners] in an enduring 
family relationship´LVrather narrower than in the English Act (³WZRSHRSOHZKHWKHU
of different sexes or the same sex) living as partners in an enduring family 
UHODWLRQVKLS´): it would seem that the Scottish court could not make an adoption 
order, as the English court did in Re T and M (Adoption),71 in favour of a stable 
couple who happened not to live together.  The definition RI³FRXSOH´LQWKHUK 2008 
Act adopts the English rather than the Scottish formulation, with the result that the 
Scottish court, unable to make an adoption order when the couple live apart, would 
nevertheless be able to follow DM v SJ72 where the English court made a parental 
order in favour of an enduring couple who did not live together.  It is to be noted that 
Hedley J in Re T and M (Adoption) dealt with the question of whether the applicants 
were a qualifying couple explicitly before turning to considerations of welfare, which 
governed the question of whether to make the order only once it had been 
determined to be competently sought.  Likewise in DM v SJ Theis J described the 
question of whether the couple were living as partners in an enduring family 
UHODWLRQVKLSDV³DTXHVWLRQRIIDFW´73 which is not of course answered by reference to 
WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH,WIROORZVWKDWWKLVFRQGLWLRQLVDVWKHWLPH-limit condition was not, 
                                               
65 2007 Act, s.29(1)(b). 
66 2002 Act, s.50. 
67 2002 Act, s.51(2).  Section 46(3)(b) provides that an adoption order in favour of the 
partner of a parent does not affect the parental responsibility of that parent. 
68 Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978, s.14; Adoption Act 1976 (England and Wales), s.14. 
69 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s.30(1). 
70 2002 Act, s.144(4); 2007 Act, s.29. 
71 [2010] EWHC 964 (Fam) [2011] 1 FLR 1487. 
72 [2016] EWHC 270 (Fam). 
73 [2016] EWHC 270 at [38]. 
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a competency determining condition-precedent.  If it is not satisfied then a parental 
order may not be made, irrespective of the effect oQWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH 
That this is so was affirmed in Re Z (A Child) (Surrogate Father: Parental Order),74 
where the rule excluding single applicants for a parental order was challenged as a 
GLVFULPLQDWRU\LQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKDVLQJOHSHUVRQ¶VULJKWWRSULYDWHDQGIDPLO\OLIHDV
protected by articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The 
applicant, a single man who became the father of a child born through a surrogacy 
arrangement in the USA, DVNHGWKHFRXUWWR³UHDGGRZQ´WKHSURYLVLRQVLQV.54(1) 
and (2) and allow his application to proceed.  Munby P refused to do so, on the 
ground that the limitation of parental orders to couples had been a clear and 
consistent feature of the legislation since its enactment, just as the absence of any 
such limitation had been a clear and consistent feature of the adoption legislation.  
This was taken to signify a very deliberate policy difference between the two orders, 
confirmed by the Parliamentary debates referred to earlier, and as such the Human 
Rights Act 1998 could not be used to interpret s.54 of the 2008 Act in any other way 
than its literal meaning.  It followed that any application by a single person had to be 
dismissed as incompetent, irrespective of the merits of the case.  
The same judge did, however, subsequently hold that the limitation of parental 
orders to couples was incompatible with article 14 taken with article 8 of the ECHR.75  
This decision was based solely on the discrimination argument and, interestingly, 
Munby P accepted that there was no breach of article 8 alone since family life would 
be sufficiently protected by the making of an adoption order.  Though inevitable in 
light of existing ECHR jurisprudence,76 this conclusion very much calls into question 
WKHVDPHMXGJH¶Vassertion in Re X (A Minor) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) that adoption 
ZRXOGQRWEHDVDWLVIDFWRU\VROXWLRQ2IFRXUVHSURWHFWLQJWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHLV
different from protecting its family life but the point remains good that welfare comes 
into play only when the order sought has been established to be competently applied 
for. 
                                               
74 [2015] EWFC 73 [2015] 1 WLR 4993. 
75 Re Z (A Child)(No2) [2016] EWHC 1191 [2016] 2 FLR 327. 
76 The European Court of Human Rights had found no infringement of family life when 
France refused to recognise the parentage of a commissioning couple in Mennesson & 
Labasse v. France (App. No. 65192/11 and 65941/11, judgment 26th June 2014) because 
WKHSDUWLHV¶IDPLO\OLIHZDVUHVSHFWHGLQRWKHUZD\VE\)UHQFKODZ 
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The Consent Condition 
A parental order is an order that is designed to follow a surrogacy arrangement, 
under which the surrogate mother has agreed to become pregnant in order to hand 
over her child at birth to the commissioning couple.  But until the order is made she 
remains in law the mother,77 and her original agreement is not enforceable.78  In 
order to ensure that her fulfilling her side of the bargain remains completely 
voluntary, the court must be satisfied that she has freely, and with full understanding 
of what is involved, agreed unconditionally to the making of the order.79  The 
protection of WKHPRWKHU¶VIUHHZLOO is reinforced by the fact that there is no power of 
WKHFRXUWWRGLVSHQVHZLWKKHURUDQ\RQHHOVH¶VFRQVHQW.  And she has the same 
protection as is found in the adoption legislation that her agreement will be 
LQHIIHFWLYHLIJLYHQOHVVWKDQVL[ZHHNVDIWHUWKHFKLOG¶VELUWK80 
$VZHOODVWKHPRWKHU¶VFRQVHQWDQ\RWKHUSHUVRQZKRLVWKHSDUHQWRIWKHFKLOG
XQOHVVDQDSSOLFDQWPXVWFRQVHQWDOVR7KHPRWKHU¶VKXVEDQGRUSDUWQHUZLOOEH
deemed parent by other provisions in the 2008 Act, so long as he or she consented 
WRWKHPRWKHU¶VLPSUHJQDWLRQZLWKRXWKLVRUKHUDGGLWLRQDOFRQVHQWWRWKHSDUHQWDO
order that order simply cannot be made,81 irrespective of the merits of the case.  So, 
as with the ³FRXSOH´condition, the obtaining of the necessary consents is a condition-
precedent that must be satisfied before the court can turn its attention to the welfare 
of the child.  As Russell J put it in A and B v X and Z ³WKHODFNRIFRQVHQWRI;>WKH
mother] to a paUHQWDORUGHU«PHDQVWKDWWKHUHLVQRTXHVWLRQRIDQ\DFWLRQXQGHU
WKH+)($IRUDSDUHQWDORUGHUZKLFKKDGEHHQWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VRULJLQDOLQWHQWLRQZKHQ
WKH\HQWHUHGLQWRDVXUURJDF\DJUHHPHQWZLWK;´82 
The same is true for adoption orders, though the major difference with adoption is 
that judicial dispensation of consent is possible83 ± and indeed is the overwhelming 
                                               
77 2008 Act, s.33. 
78 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, s.1A. 
79 2007 Act, s.54(6). 
80 2008 Act, s.54(7): cf 2002 Act, s.52(3); 2007 Act, s.31(11). 
81 See for example Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) [2007] EWHC 2814 (Fam) [2008] 1 
FLR 1047. 
82 [2016] EWFC 34 at [7], repeated at [84]. 
83 2002 Act, s.52; 2007 Act, s.31. 
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source of dispute with opposed adoptions ± while dispensation is not possible under 
the parental order legislation.  Only if a parent cannot be found84 or is incapable of 
giving agreement is their agreement not necessary.85  English courts have 
occasionally referred to their finding that a parent cannot be found as a ground to 
³GLVSHQVH´ZLWKSDUHQWDODJUHHPHQW86 (as it would be with adoption applications) but 
in principle if a parent cannot be found then his or her consent to a parental order is 
not required.87  7KHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHis one of the statutory bases for the decision to 
dispense with parental consent to adoption88 but the question simply does not arise 
in parental order applications.  ,IWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHUHTXLUHVWUDQVIHUHQFHRI
parenthood from a refusing parent then adoption provides the only mechanism to 
achieve it. 
There is no requirement that the child provide any consent to the making of a 
parental order, doubtless because the drafters assumed that the child will be no 
more than six months old at the date of the making of the order, though (presumably 
having in mind the transitional case of a couple becoming eligible to apply for a 
parental order when they were previously not eligible89) there is provision in the 
subordinate legislation IRUHQVXULQJWKDWWKHFKLOG¶VYLHZVDUHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW90  
However, the issue may become more significant than was originally intended since 
the judicial repealing of the six month time limit.  Scottish (but not English) adoption 
ODZKDVDOZD\VUHTXLUHGWKHROGHUFKLOG¶VFRQVHQW91 and if a parental order is sought 
in respect of a child of 12 or more the lack of requirement of consent will be a lacuna 
RQO\YHU\SDUWLDOO\ILOOHGE\WKHUHTXLUHPHQWWRWDNHDFFRXQWRIWKHFKLOG¶VYLHZV 
 
                                               
84 As in AB & CD v CT (Parental Order: Consent of Surrogate Mother) [2015] EWFC 12 
[2016] 1 FLR 41. 
85 2008 Act, s.54(7). 
86 Re D (Children)(Parental Order: Foreign Surrogacy) Practice Note [2012] EWHC 2631 
[2013] 1 WLR 3135. 
87 As Hedley J said in G v G (Parental Order: Revocation) [2012] EWHC 1979 [2013] 1 FLR 
DW>@VLV³DWUXHYHWRDQGWKHFRXUWXQOLNHLQDGRSWLRQSURFHHGLQJVKDVQR
GLVSHQVLQJSRZHU´ 
88 2002 Act, s.52(1)(b); 2007 Act, s.31(3)(d). 
89 2008 Act, s.54(11). 
90 2007 Act, s.14(4)(b), as applied to parental order applications by the 2010 Regulations, 
Sch 3 para 1 (and see also the curator DGOLWHP¶V duty in this regard under the Child Care 
and Maintenance Rules, r. 2.51(2)(h)); s.1(4)(a) of the 2002 Act, as applied by the 2010 
Regulations, Sch 1 para 1. 
91 Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act 1930, s.2(3).  See now 2007 Act, s.32. 
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The No Payments Condition 
Before making a parental order, the court must be satisfied that no money or other 
benefit (other than for expenses reasonably incurred) has been given or received by 
either of the applicants for or in consideration of: (a) the making of the order, (b) any 
consent to the making of the order, (c) the handing over of the child to the applicants, 
or (d) the making of arrangements with a view to the making of the order, all of this 
unless authorised by the court.92  One may be confident that this condition is traced 
to a Parliamentary desire to avoid the commercialisation of surrogacy, earlier 
encapsulated in the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985.  Yet the policy of 
discouraging commercialisation is given effect to only very half-heartedly in the 2008 
Act.  Oddly, the rule in s.54(8) does not in its terms prohibit payments to the 
surrogate.  Rather, it is directed to the applicants: no money must be given or 
received by either of the applicants.  This focus is surprising given that the applicants 
will be the receivers of money only vanishingly rarely.  The adoption legislation, 
similarly aimed at avoiding commercialisation, is in rather wider terms.  The Scottish 
Act prohibits as a criminal act ³DQ\SD\PHQWPDGHWRDQ\SHUVRQ´93 while the English 
$FWSURKLELWV³DQ\SD\PHQW´94 in both cases certain specified payments are 
³H[FHSWHGSD\PHQWV´ZKLFKGRQRWFRQVWLWXWHWKHFULPLQDORIIence.  The difference 
means that payments made by a third party to the birth parent (unlikely, but by no 
means outwith the bounds of imagination) would not be an offence under the 
surrogacy legislation but would be under the adoption legislation. 
These differences are subtle and perhaps more apparent than real.  More substantial 
is the different judicial approaches to monetisation, which remains a matter of 
significant concern with adoption but has become an accepted (or at least tolerated) 
feature of the practice of surrogacy.95 
Authorising payments is indeed by far the most common issue that the English 
courts face in respect of s.54 of the 2008 Act.  The Act does not set out the grounds 
                                               
92 2008 Act, s.54(8). 
93 2007 Act, s.72(1). 
94 2002 Act, s.95(1). 
95 ,WSDVVHGHQWLUHO\ZLWKRXWFRPPHQWWKDWWKHGRFXPHQWVHWWLQJRXWWKHPRWKHU¶VDJUHHPHQW
in Re X (Foreign Surrogacy: ChiOG¶V1DPH [2016] EWHC 1068 (Fam) expressed it as 
DJUHHPHQWWKDW³WKHFKLOGFRQWUDFWXDOO\DQGJHQHWLFDOO\EHORQJVWR´WKHDSSOLFDQWVDW>@
Nor indeed was any adverse comment made on the fact that of the USD $48,333.49 paid by 
the applicants only $5,600 was received by the mother (at [27]-[28]). 
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upon which the court should determine whether to grant authorisation or not, and 
while WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH ZLOOGRXEWOHVVEHDWWKHIRUHIURQWRIWKHFRXUW¶VPLQGLWLV
noticeable that no court has suggested that this is the primary test for authorising 
payments.  In C v S Lord Weir in the Court of Session SRLQWHGRXWWKDWWKHFKLOG¶V
welfare should not be used in a way that undermines the public policy of 
discouraging child-trafficking.96  In determining whether that public policy is 
subverted, the English courts have concentrated on the good faith of the parties: if 
WKHUHLVQRGHOLEHUDWHDWWHPSWWRE\SDVVWKHODZ¶VSURWHFWLRQVauthorisation will 
usually be granted where it is in the interests of the child for the order to be made.  
Having reviewed the authorities in Re X and Anor (Children) (Parental Order: 
Foreign Surrogacy)97 Hedley J said this: 
³,QUHODWLRQWRSXEOLFSROLF\LVVXHVWKHFDVHVLQHIIHFWVXJJHVWDQG,DJUHH
that the court pose itself three questions: (1) was the sum paid 
disproportionate to reasonable expenses? (2) Were the applicants acting in 
JRRGIDLWKDQGZLWKRXWµPRUDOWDLQW¶LQWKHLUGHDOLQJVZLWKWKHVXUURJDWH
mother? (3) Were the applicants party to any attempt to defraud the 
DXWKRULWLHV"´98 
The issue of authorisation of payments arises far less frequently in the adoption 
situation, where monetisation of the process has long, and for obviously good 
reasons,99 been met with visceral distaste.  Even with adoption, however, the 
interests of the individual child involved tend to encourage us to put that distaste to 
one side.  The Scottish adoption legislation permits the court to grant authorisation of 
                                               
96 1996 SLT 1387 at 1399.  See also Baker J in Re D and L (children)(surrogacy: parental 
order) [2012] EWHC 2631 (Fam) [2013] 1 All ER 962.  P. Beaumont and K. Trimmings, 
³5HFHQW-XULVSUXGHQFHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWVLQWKH$UHDRI&URVV-Border 
6XUURJDF\,V7KHUH6WLOOD1HHGIRU*OREDO5HJXODWLRQRI6XUURJDF\"´$EHUGHHQ8QLYHUVLW\
School of Law Working Papers No 2016/3, p.3, suggest that most recent ECtHR decisions 
³SRLQWWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKHSULQFLSOHRIWKHEHVW interests of the child should prevail over 
SXEOLFSROLF\FRQVLGHUDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJVXUURJDF\DQGDGRSWLRQ´%XWWKHVHFDVHVQHHGWREH
read bearing in mind the clear ban on the sale of or traffic in children: UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, art. 35 and Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, arts. 1 and 2. 
97 [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam) [2009] Fam 71 at [21]. 
98 See also Re Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: Re A, B and C (Infants) [2016] 
EWFC 33 where authorisation of payments was granted notwithstanding the attempt by the 
applicants to mislead (admittedly slightly) the courts as to their extent. 
99 One need only read the facts and the powerful words of Munby J in Re M (Adoption: 
International Adoption Trade) [2003] EWHC 219 (Fam) [2003] 1 FLR 1111 to understand the 
dangers. 
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payments which, in the absence of authorisation, would amount to a criminal 
offence.100  Authorisation was granted in C v S,101 the court emphasising that the 
welfare of the child was relevant but not determining.  Court authorisation (sensibly) 
no longer features in the English adoption legislation.102  Also, the Scottish Act 
explicitly allows the court to make the adoption order even where an unlawful 
payment has been made,103 but that too is omitted from the English Act.  
Nevertheless, in A, B v A Local Authority, C104  Keenan J held that the absence in 
English law of any prohibition on making an adoption order in face of unlawful 
payments (which, it may be noted, appeared in the Scottish adoption legislation until 
1997105 and the English legislation until 2005106) meant that he was free to do so. 
The 2008 Act (once more) follows the English adoption model here and makes no 
mention of whether the parental order may or may not be made if payments are not 
authorised but if Keenan J is to be followed, then the omission does not matter and 
the order may be made even in favour of applicants who have committed a criminal 
offence.  The issue may be more theoretical than real, however, since in no reported 
English case has the court ever, in fact, refused to grant authorisation of an 
otherwise unlawful payment in connection with the making of a parental order.  This 
is in contrast to adoption where orders have been refused ± if only very rarely and 
not in the very recent past.107 
 
&RQGLWLRQV5HODWLQJWR&KLOG¶V*HVWDWLRQDODQG*HQHWLF2ULJLQV 
A parental order is available only if the surrogate mother became pregnant as a 
result of the placing in her of an embryo or sperm and eggs or her artificial 
                                               
100 2007 Act, s.73(2)(c). 
101 1996 SLT 1387. 
102 The Adoption Act 1976 permitted, by s.57(3), the court to authorise unlawful payments 
but there is no equivalent in the 2002 Act. 
103 2007 Act, s.34. 
104 [2014] EWHC 4816 (Fam). 
105 The Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 contained such a prohibition until the Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995 Sch 2(16) reversed the rule and the wording of the new s.24(2) was 
replicated in s.34 of the 2007 Act. 
106 Adoption Act 1976, s.24(2), repealed with the rest of that Act by the 2002 Act. 
107 See Re C (A Minor)(Adoption Application) [1993] 1 FLR 87. 
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insemination.108  It cannot plausibly be argued that the method of conception affects 
WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHWKURXJKRXWhis or her life and this limitation on the availability of 
parental orders is likely traced to the fact that the 2008 Act as a whole determines 
parenthood for artificially and not naturally conceived children.  It is difficult to identify 
any good social policy achieved by the rule ± other than, perhaps, the maintenance 
of some distance between surrogacy and prostitution.    Factual disputes could arise 
as to whether or not the insemination was artificial,109 and these would be resolved 
(like all factual disputes) without regard to the welfare of the child. 
7KHUH is of course no equivalent rule with adoption where the overwhelming majority 
of adopted children will have been conceived by natural means.  Adoption does not 
need any distance to be created between it and prostitution, because the mother is 
not being paid to fall pregnant (by any means): the child already exists.  So it would 
seem that the difference in the UXOHVDSSOLFDEOHWRHDFKRUGHULVWUDFHGWRWKHFKLOG¶V
existence or otherwise when the plans for the order are made.  The one order is 
designed to provide a home for an existing child while the other order is designed to 
provide a child for a couple ± starkly illustrating once again that the focus of parental 
orders is on the needs (desires) of adults. 
A related condition for a parental order to be available is that the (surrogate) 
mother110 is not one of the applicants.111  This is in stark contrast to the adoption 
legislation, where it has always been possible for a mother to adopt her own child.112  
The difference in approach between the two orders reflects the difference in intention 
behind the application.  The purpose of a parental order is to transfer parenthood 
from the mother who never intended to act as such to those who were always 
intended to act as parents; the making of an adoption order will never have been the 
intent with which the subject of an adoption application was conceived.  Intent is 
thereby revealed as one of the major points of distinction between the two orders. 
                                               
108 2008 Act, s.54(1)(a). 
109 See M v F (Legal Paternity) [2013] EWHC 1901 (Fam), where such a dispute arose in a 
non-surrogacy context. 
110 2008 Act, s.33, provides that the woman who carried the child, and no other woman, is to 
be treated (for all purposes of law: s.48) as the mother of the child. 
111 2008 Act, s.54(1)(a). 
112 Adoption of Children Act 1926 s.1, Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act 1930, s.1: see 
now 2002 Act, s.51(4) and 2007 Act, s.30(1)(d) and (7). 
22 
 
Though the surrogate mother must not be an applicant, the embryo she carries must 
have been created with the gametes of at least one of the applicants.113  During the 
debates on the 2008 Act, the Government minister explained this condition as one 
³WKDWUHFRJQLVHVWKHPDJQLWXGHRIDVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFKDSHUVRQEHFRPHVSUHJQDQW
with the express intention of handing the child over to someone else, and the 
responsibility that that places on the peoplHZKRZLOOUHFHLYHWKHFKLOG´114  The whole 
point of both parental orders and adoption orders is to effect a transference of 
parenthood and its associated responsibilities from legal to social parents.  But 
unlike with adoption, an additional aim of parental orders is to align genetic and legal 
parenthood with one and sometimes with both applicants.  If neither of the 
commissioning couple is the genetic parent then that alignment is impossible and the 
only way to achieve the desired transference of parenthood is through adoption, 
which does not seek any such alignment. 
Each of these conditions to the making of a parental order may well justify treating 
VXUURJDF\DQGDGRSWLRQGLIIHUHQWO\EXWQRQHRIWKHPLPSOLFDWHVWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH
The factual scenarios behind applications for parental orders and adoption orders 
may be different (though overlapping) but the assertion that a child is better being 
brought up by his or her genetic as opposed to gestational mother is one that 
undermines the rest of the 2008 Act ± and perhaps the very concept of adoption 
itself. 
 
7KH³+RPH´&RQGLWLRQ 
At the time both of the application for a parental order and of its making, the child's 
home must be with the applicants.115  This condition caused the court some difficulty 
in A v P (Surrogacy: Parental Order: Death of Applicant),116 in which a married 
couple had applied for a parental order but one of the applicants died before the 
order was made: could it be said, in these circumstances, that the child had his 
                                               
113 $FWVE³*DPHWHV´GRQRWLQFOXGHGRQDWLRQVRIPLWRFKRQGULDOUDWKHUWKDQ 
nuclear) DNA: 2008 Act, s.54(1A), inserted by Reg.18 of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015/572. 
114 HC Public Bill Committee, 12 June 2008, col.248. 
115 2008 Act, s.54(4)(a). 
116 [2012] EWHC 1738 (Fam) [2012] 2 FLR 145. 
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KRPH³ZLWKWKHDSSOLFDQWV´"The court answered the question affirmatively, on the 
basis that s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 required the condition to be interpreted 
expansively.  Theis J held that to refuse the order in this case would amount to an 
interference in the family life that had been established between the child and the 
surviving applicant, with whom he had lived all of his short life.  The judge found 
reinforcement in this conclusion in article 8 of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the ChilGZKLFKSURWHFWVWKHFKLOG¶VULJKWWRLGHQWLW\Yet an adoption order in the 
circumstances would equally have protected the established family life117 and it is 
difficult to see how such an order ZRXOGLQWHUIHUHZLWKWKHFKLOG¶VLGHQWLW\DQ\PRUH
than a parental order would. 
This condition has, indeed, proved surprisingly troublesome for the courts.  In Re X 
(A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limits)118 the child was held to have had his home at all 
times with the applicants even although they had separated but then reconciled 
before the order was applied for.  More startling was the decision of Theis J to make 
a parental order in favour of a commissioning couple who remained separated (and 
one having obtained a non-molestation order against the other), holding that the 
children had homes with each of the couple, and with no-one else.119  What these 
cases illustrate is a strong preference on the part of the English courts to find this 
condition satisfied, so as to avoid holding an application incompetent which is, 
usually, not opposed by anyone.120 
The same strong preference is shown in adoption cases, even when contentious.  
The rule is that an adoption order may only be made if the child is living with the 
adopters, and has been for a specified period (which varies depending upon the 
FKLOG¶VH[LVWLQJUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHDGRSWHUV).121  This rule requires a period of 
residence rather than, as with parental orders, residence at particular points in time 
                                               
117 See Re Z (A Child)(No2) [2016] EWHC 1191 [2016] 2 FLR 327)(No2) [2016] EWHC 1191 
[2016] 2 FLR 327, per Munby P to this effect (discussed above).  
118 [2014] EWHC 3135 [2015] 1 FLR 349. 
119 X v Y [2015] EWHC 2080.  See also DM v SJ [2016] EWHC 270 (Fam). 
120 In G v G (Parental Order: Revocation) [2012] EWHC [2013] 1 FLR 286 1979 Hedley J 
warned against granting applications for parental orders without giving detailed consideration 
to the statutory requirements merely because the application was unopposed.  Parental 
orders are designed WREHXQRSSRVHGDQG+HGOH\-¶VZLVHZRUGVDUHDOOWKHPRUHDSSRVLWH
because that lack of opposition means that the granting of a parental order is effectively 
unappealable. 
121 2002 Act, s.42; 2007 Act, s.15. 
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but that difference is probably more apparent than real.  There are no Scottish cases 
in which an adoption order has been made in favour of a couple who do not live 
WRJHWKHUUHTXLULQJWKHFRXUWWRLQWHUSUHW³WKHFKLOG¶VKRPH«ZLWKWKHDSSOLFDQWV´WR
include two homes with the applicants severally) but the issue arose in Re T and M 
(Adoption)122 where a couple who lived apart but had been in a family relationship for 
RYHU\HDUVZHUHSHUPLWWHGWRDGRSWDVDFRXSOH³OLYLQJDVSDUWQHUVLQDQHQGXULQJ
family relationsKLS´,QWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHMXGJHGHFODUHG himself satisfied that 
the rule in s.42(3) of the 2002 Act had also been satisfied, without detailed 
discussion but with reference to the closeness of the family as a whole.123   
 
The $SSOLFDQWV¶Domicile Condition 
To be eligible to apply for a parental order, either or both of the applicants must be 
domiciled in the United Kingdom or in the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man.124  This 
is rather narrower than the equivalent rule in the adoption legislation where, as an 
alternative to domicile,125 an adoption application may be made if both applicants (or 
the sole applicant) have been habitually resident in the British Islands for a period of 
at least one year ending with the date of the application.126  So the range of people 
eligible to apply for an adoption order is wider than the range eligible to apply for a 
parental order.127  The application of the rule has caused little conceptual difficulty in 
relation to either order, but its true importance, at least in English law, lies in the fact 
that s.49(2) of the 2002 Act has been held to provide the fundamental rule of 
jurisdiction of the English court for adoption applications.128  If, as seems likely, the 
                                               
122 [2010] EWHC 964 (Fam) [2011] 1 FLR 1487. 
123 The issue need not arise if the applicants are married or civilly partnered because there is 
no condition that they be a stable family unit, though whether they are or not will, of course, 
be relevant to the welfare test.  See Re CC (Adoption Application: Separated Applicants) 
[2013] EWHC 4815 (Fam) [2015] 2 FLR 281. 
124 2008 Act, s.54(4)(b). 
125 2007 Act, ss.29(2)(a), 30(6(a) and 119(1); 2002 Act, s.49(2).   
126 2007 Act, ss.29(2)(b), 30(6)(b) and 119(1); 2002 Act, s.49(3).  
127 See Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) [2007] EWHC 2814 (Fam) [2008] 1 FLR 1047 
where the domiciliary requirements were not satisfied and an order was made under s.84 of 
2002 Act to give the applicants parental responsibility prior to their seeking an adoption order 
from a foreign court. 
128 Re N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) [2015] EWCA Civ 1112 [2016] 2 WLR 713 (CA), 
per Munby P at [76] and Black LJ at [182].  See also Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict 
of Laws (15th edn, 2012) at [20-096].  The outcome in Re N was of course reversed by the 
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same approach is followed in the surrogacy situation then s.54(4)(b) of the 2008 Act 
will govern both eligibility to apply and jurisdiction: the result would be that English 
courts will have jurisdiction to make parental orders only when either or both 
applicants is domiciled in the British Islands, and their habitual residence in England 
would be insufficient to establish jurisdiction (unlike with adoption orders).  This is a 
competency determining rule in the sense that the application would require to be 
dismissed without an examination of its merits if jurisdiction is not established, 
LUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHHIIHFWRQWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH  It may be noted in passing that with 
both orders, the focus is on the domicile or habitual residence of the applicants, and 
not of the mother (or other parent) ± even when, in adoption, she is opposing the 
application.  Nor, as the Court of Appeal in Re N emphasised, is the domicile or 
habitual residence, or nationality, of the child of any relevance. 
The position in Scotland is radically different because the Scottish rule of jurisdiction 
in adoption is traced to s.118 of the 2007 Act, ZKLFKGHILQHV³WKHDSSURSULDWHFRXUW´
(that is to say the court that may make an adoption order129) as either the Court of 
Session (if the child is or is not in Scotland) or the sheriff court of the (local) 
sheriffdom within which the child is: in other words, jurisdiction in adoption is 
GHWHUPLQHGE\WKHFKLOG¶VSUHVHQFH130  This excludes the possibility of using the 
eligibility rules131 as the basis for jurisdiction.132  This jurisdiction rule based on the 
FKLOG¶Vpresence was extended to Scottish parental orders by the 2010 
Regulations,133 with the result that the Scottish court may make parental orders in 
substantially broader circumstances than the English court.  Section 54(4)(b) of the 
2008 Act, as it applies in Scotland, thenLVQRWWKHVRXUFHRIWKHFRXUW¶VJHRJUDSKLFDO
jurisdiction (as it might be in England) but is an additional rule to be satisfied before 
the court, with jurisdiction, can make the parental order.  Yet the aSSOLFDQWV¶GRPLFLOH
rule is just as likely in Scotland as in England to be conceptualised as a condition-
                                                                                                                                                  
Supreme Court (Re N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) (AIRE Centre and others 
intervening) [2016] UKSC 15 [2016] 2 WLR 1103), but the jurisdiction point was not 
challenged on appeal. 
129 2007 Act, s.28(1). 
130 See P. McNeill and M. Jack:  Adoption of Children in Scotland (4th edn, 2010) at [5.18]; G. 
Maher and B. Rodger Civil Jurisdiction in the Scottish Courts (2010) at [10.100]. 
131 2007 Act, ss.29 and 30. 
132 ³7KHVHUXOHVUHODWHPRUHWRFRPSHWHQFHWKDQMXULVGLFWLRQ´0DKHUDQG5RGJHURSFLWDW
[10.101]. 
133 2010 Regulations, Sch.3, applying with only terminological amendments ss.28(1) and 118 
of the 2007 Act. 
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precedent to be satisfied before welfare can be considered.134  There is therefore no 
scope to bypass WKLVFRQGLWLRQRQWKHJURXQGWKDWWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDre requires that the 
order be made. 
 
7KH$SSOLFDQWV¶$JH&RQGLWLRQ 
At the time of the making of a parental order both the applicants must have attained 
the age of 18.135  This condition is less restrictive than the equivalent rules in the 
adoption legislation, where both applicants (or the sole applicant) must be over the 
age of 21, except when one of the applicants (or, in Scotland, the sole applicant) is 
the partner of the parent of the child in which case the parent must be over the age 
of 18 years.136  It would be implausible to suggest that the decision to create a child 
through surrogacy demands less maturity than the decision to join in the adoption of 
an already existing child. 
There is no law preventing the surrogacy arrangement itself from being made by 
persons under 18: the legislation merely makes a parental order unavailable.  If a 
child is born through surrogacy and handed over to a couple one or both of whom is 
under 18, then it might be possible to wait until the applicants have reached the 
appropriate age, utilising if necessary the (deeply flawed but precedential) reasoning 
in Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) to make the application out of time once 
the applicants have attained that age.  Since adoption would not be available until 
the couple are both over 21 (neither yet being recognised as parent) this is one of 
the few VFHQDULRVLQZKLFKWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHPLJKWZHOOjustify an expansive 
interpretation of the conditions for the making of a parental order. 
  
Conclusion  
                                               
134 The form of application certainly suggests that the domicile requirement is a condition that 
goes to competency: see para. 1 of Form 22 in the Child Care and Maintenance Rules 1997, 
Sch. 1. 
135 2008 Act, s.54(5). 
136 2002 Act, ss.50 and 51; 2007 Act, ss.29(1) and 30(1). 
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In Re A (A Child)137 Russell J said this: 
³The very existence of parental orders is a testament to the decision of 
Parliament that adoption orders do not befit children born through surrogacy.  
Parliament provided parental orders to be the legal remedy designed for 
surrogacy situations and it is a contrivance to use adoption as an alternative 
solution unless there is no other optioQZLWKLQWKHFRXUW¶VGLVFUHWLRQ´.   
There is no doubt that parental orders were designed for a very different fact 
scenario from adoption orders.  The defining difference is that with the former a child 
was deliberately created in circumstances that require to be regularised by means of 
court order while with the latter the child is already in existence before any question 
of court intervention arises.  There is another important difference in practice, which 
is that parental orders are designed never to be opposed, while adoption (especially 
when the end result of a child protection process) is often a most bitterly fought 
action. 
Yet these distinctions are less significant than they might appear.  They are 
differences of fact that do not in themselves require to be reflected in different 
orders.  Adoption as a process was designed in the 1920s to deal with social 
problems of the interwar era,138 and has been adapted since then to deal with a 
variety of emerging social issues.139  Today, the single concept of adoption serves at 
least two very different fact scenarios: after family reconstitution in which the process 
attempts to reflect DQHZUHDOLW\E\W\LQJWKHFKLOGWRDSDUHQW¶VQHZSDUWQHUZKRis 
performing the role of social parent; and after child protection processes have 
compulsorily removed the child from inadequate parents and delivered the child to 
legal strangers.  A process that is capable of accommodating such widely differing 
scenarios is no less capable of accommodating the surrogacy situation ± and has 
frequently been used in that very situation, even after parental orders became 
available in 1990.140  This being so, it may be concluded that the creation of parental 
orders was an entirely unnecessary legal response to an emotional issue ± DGXOWV¶
                                               
137 [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam) at [68]. 
138 Such as illegitimacy: see D, Petitioner 1938 SC 223. 
139 6HH05RVV³$GRSWLRQLQWKHst &HQWXU\6WLOO,PDJH$JDLQVWD0RYLQJ3LFWXUH´LQ-
Scoular, ed. Family Dynamics: Contemporary Issues in Family Law (Butterworths 2001). 
140 Examples include Re MW (Adoption: Surrogacy) [1995] 2 FLR 759; C v S 1996 SLT 137; 
Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) [2007] EWHC 2814 (Fam) [2008] 1 FLR 1047. 
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GHVLUHVIRUWKHLU³RZQ´FKLOG.  And it has proved a socially disastrous response by 
creating an environment in which our justified distaste at the commercialisation of 
child-creation has become progressively blunted.  To the commissioning couple who 
feel affronted DWKDYLQJWR³EX\WKHLURZQFKLOGEDFN´the hard answer is: the child is 
not yours.  An order under s.54 is not a declaratory order recognising a pre-existing 
reality of parenthood (however much the applicants might conceive it that way), but 
is instead one that transfers parenthood from those who are, in law, parents to those 
who, before the order is made, are not.  The welfare of the child alone can never 
justify such a transfer.141  In the surrogacy situation it is the altruism ± even when 
bought ± of WKHFKLOG¶VPRWKHU that does so. 
Likewise5XVVHOO-¶VGLFWXPTXRWHGDERYHVD\VOHVVWKDQLWVHHPV to.  That adoption 
RXJKWQRWWREHXVHG³XQOHVVWKHUHLVQRRWKHURSWLRQ´EHJVWKHTXHVWLRQZKLFKRIWKH
conditions contained in s.54 of the 2008 Act is so absolute that the failure to fulfil it 
means that there is indeed no other legal option?  Of the conditions discussed 
above, it is clear that the great majority are absolute, with no scope at all for the 
court to make a parental order when they are not satisfied, with adoption remaining 
the only option to achieve a transference of parenthood.  The absolute conditions are 
(LWKDWWKHDSSOLFDWLRQEHPDGHE\DTXDOLI\LQJ³FRXSOH´LLWKDWWKHH[LVWLQJSDUHQWV
agree unconditionally to the making of the order, (iii) that the mother is not one of the 
applicants, (iv) that the conception has come about artificially, (v) that the gametes of 
at least one of the applicants have been used for that conception, (vi) that either or 
both applicants are domiciled in the British Islands, and (vii) that both applicants 
have attained the age of 18.  The non-satisfaction of any of these conditions means 
that an application for a parental order must be rejected as incompetent irrespective 
of its merits ± irrespective, that is, of the effect of the UHMHFWLRQRQWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH  
There are two other conditions that, by their very nature, involve an element of 
judicial discretion: that no payments have been made unless authorised by the court 
(which requires the court to exercise judgment), and that the child has his or her 
home with the applicants at particular points in time (which envisages the court 
assessing WKHPHDQLQJRI³KRPH´.  How that discretion is exercised is affected by 
considerations of welfare but that cannot be the determining factor of whether the 
                                               
141 S v L 2012 UKSC 30. 
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condition is satisfied or not.142  There is only one condition ± the six month time-limit 
± that has been held to be governed E\WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH7KHEDVLVRIWKH
extension (or, better, abolition) of the time-limit ± that the FKLOG¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWVZRXOG
not be served by adoption ± is fatally weakened by the non-availability of that 
argument in respect of every other condition in s.54. 
Virtually every surrogacy case that reaches the higher courts involves the judges 
emphasising the need for caution, warning against the dangers of lack of regulation 
and of international agreement, and bringing attention to the emotive challenges 
before the court when faced with children whose interests are palpably served by 
remaining with the loving couple bringing them up but for whom the legal process 
has thrown up counter-considerations.   The safest solution would be to abolish 
parental orders and allow the existing adoption legislation to tackle these problems 
utilising principles already developed over the course of many decades.  That is 
unlikely to happen and so the clash between social policy and individual welfare can 
only properly be resolved, without emotion and in a manner consistent with the Rule 
of Law itself, if WKHFKLOG¶VLQWHUHVts are confined to the appropriate stage of the 
judicial decision-making process ± which is the determination of the outcome of the 
case once the competency determining conditions-precedent for the making of the 
order sought have been satisfied.  The cases involving the time-limit failed to do so 
but at the end of the day that particular condition is the one with the least rationale: it 
achieves, in other words, no obvious benefit to anyone.  So long as these cases are 
kept within their own boundaries, and considerations of welfare are constrained as 
suggested above, they will have no wider impact and if, as is probably inevitable,143 
Parliament eventually repeals s.54(3) children will neither benefit nor suffer 
disadvantage.  But the correct balance between the judicial and the legislative roles 
in our legal system(s), disrupted by Munby P, will have been restored. 
                                               
142 See n.7 above. 
143 The (English and Welsh) Law Commission is (at the time of writing) consulting on 
whether to include surrogacy and parental orders within its 13th Programme of Law Reform. 
